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Abstract
We again examine how the managers' bargaining power affects social welfare and the firms'
profits in both quantity and price competition, in particular, in the case where each firm's
production technology is represented by a quadratic cost function. We show that under both
the competition types, if the relative bargaining power of managers is sufficiently low,
increase in the power results in the decrease of each firm's profit and the increase of social
welfare; on the other hand, if the managers' relative bargaining power is sufficiently high, its
increase leads to the deterioration of social welfare due to the excessively high total cost in
the market. This result is somewhat in contrast to the existing ones obtained in the constant
marginal cost case, and hence, our findings show that they are not robust against the change
in the type of each firm's cost function.
We are grateful to the associate editor (Tomas Sjostrom) and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments and suggestions.
We appreciate the financial support from the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports and Technology under Waseda
University 21st-COE GLOPE project. Needless to say, we are responsible for any remaining errors.
Citation: Nakamura, Yasuhiko, (2008) "Bargaining over Managerial Contracts in Delegation Games: The Quadratic Cost
Case." Economics Bulletin, Vol. 12, No. 16 pp. 1-7
Submitted: May 20, 2008.  Accepted: June 6, 2008.
URL: http://economicsbulletin.vanderbilt.edu/2008/volume12/EB-08L20007A.pdf1 Introduction
This paper presents a theoretical analysis of bargaining over managerial delegation between
an owner-shareholder and a manager in the case in which each ﬁrm’s production technology
is represented by a quadratic cost function. For a long time, traditional economic theories
have solely regarded a ﬁrm as a proﬁt-maximizing agent. However, in particular, in large
corporations, we usually observe the separation of ownership and management. The literature on
industrial organization has challenged this diﬃcult issue since the mid-1980s, adopting modern
game theoretical techniques. Fershtman and Judd (1987), Sklivas (1987), and Vickers (1985)
considered the situation where both an owner and a manager exist within a single ﬁrm and the
owner provides the manager with the managerial incentive contract based on both the ﬁrm’s
proﬁt and sales (the sales delegation case), adopting a multi-stage game. Then, the owner
strategically manipulates the incentive parameter in the managerial contract, such that her/his
proﬁt-maximizing objective is fulﬁlled at maximum in the duopolistic market outcomes. In
the above three works, they showed that in the case of quantity competition, the managerial
incentive contracts lead to more aggressive behavior on the part of each ﬁrm in the marketplace
than in a standard un-delegated duopolistic case, while in the case of price competition, it results
in less aggressive behavior on the part of each ﬁrm. Subsequently, the literature in this area has
developed towards the direction in which a new style of managerial contracts is proposed. Salas
Fumas (1992) and Miller and Pazgal (2001) considered two-stage games in which the manager’s
incentive contract is based on a weighted sum of the ﬁrm’s own proﬁt and its rival’s proﬁt (the
relative performance case). Jansen et al. (2007)) and Ritz (2008) examined the market share
version of the delegation contract, i.e., the contract scheme on the basis of a combination of its
own proﬁt and market share (market share case).
In their recent work, van Witteloostuijn et al. (2007) considered the two-stage delegation
games in which owner-shareholders negotiate the incentive parameter on the managerial contract
with the managers in the ﬁrst stage, and subsequently in the second stage, Cournot competition
engaged in by each ﬁrm’s manager evolves in a homogeneous goods market. They showed that
in the sales delegation case, if the bargaining power of the managers increases, the equilibrium
proﬁt of each ﬁrm decreases and social welfare increases. In the context of both quantity and
price competition, Nakamura (2008) and Kamaga and Nakamura (2008) extended their scope to
the cases of diﬀerentiated goods and sequential competition, respectively, and thus considered
the robustness of the result in van Witteloostuijn et al. (2007). In both the papers, they obtained
a result similar to that in van Witteloostuijn et al. (2007).
This paper aims to examine the case where the production technology of each ﬁrm is repre-
sented by a quadratic cost function without capacity constraint against the case of a constant
marginal cost function as in van Witteloostuijn et al. (2007), Nakamura (2008) and Kamaga
and Nakamura (2008) and, further, to check the robustness of the result in their papers.1 We
work with the case of the simultaneous-move game under the the types of competition, quantity
and price competition, in the same manner of Nakamura (2008) and Kamaga and Nakamura
(2008). The result obtained in this paper is that if the relative bargaining power of managers is
1The assumption of each ﬁrm’s cost function in this paper justiﬁes the presence of a ﬁnite and small number
of ﬁrms.
1suﬃciently high, the equilibrium social welfare deteriorates in both the competition types, un-
like the results of the three papers, namely, van Witteloostuijn et al., Nakamura, and Kamaga
and Nakamura. This is so because in the case of the quadratic cost function, in contrast to the
constant marginal cost case, the decrease in the producer surplus outweighs the increase in the
consumer surplus due to the excessively high total cost in the market as the relative bargaining
power of managers increases, when it is suﬃciently high.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formulate the basic
setting of the delegation game of the two types of models considered in this paper. In Section 3,
we consider the case of quantity competition. In Section 4, we investigate the case of price com-
petition. Section 5 presents the concluding remarks. A detailed description of the equilibrium
market outcomes in each competition is relegated to the Appendix.
2 Model
We consider a symmetric duopolistic model using a standard product diﬀerentiation model as
in Singh and Vives (1984). A representative consumer’s utility is denoted as
U(q1;q2) = a(q1 + q2) ¡
1
2
h
(q1)
2 + 2bq1q2 + (q2)
2
i
+ q;
where qi represents the quantity of good i (= 1;2), and b 2 (0;1) represents the degree of
product diﬀerentiation. Note that q denotes a numeraire good. The utility function generates
the system of linear demand functions:
qi =
a(1 ¡ b) ¡ pi + bpj
1 ¡ b2 ; b 2 (0;1); i;j = 1;2; i 6= j:
Then, the inverse demand functions can be inverted to obtain
pi = a ¡ qi ¡ bqj; b 2 (0;1); i;j = 1;2; i 6= j;
where pi represents the price of good i (= 1;2). We assume that the production technology of
each ﬁrm is represented by a quadratic cost function. The proﬁt of ﬁrm i is given by
Πi = (a ¡ qi ¡ bqj)qi ¡
1
2
k(qi)
2 ;
=
[a(1 ¡ b) ¡ pi + bpj]
©
2
¡
1 ¡ b2¢
pi ¡ k[a(1 ¡ b) ¡ pi + bpj]
ª
2(1 ¡ b2)
2 ; i;j = 1;2; i 6= j:
Usually, social welfare, denoted by W, is measured as the sum of consumer surplus (CS) and
producer surplus (PS):
W = CS + PS;
where PS = Π1 + Π2, and CS is given by
CS =
1
2
h
(q1)
2 + 2bq1q2 + (q2)
2
i
;
=
2a2 (1 ¡ b) + (p1)
2 ¡ 2bp1p2 + (p2)
2 ¡ 2a(1 ¡ b)(p1 + p2)
2(1 ¡ b2)
:
2We consider the situation in which a ﬁrm’s owner decides to delegate the control of his or
her assets to a manager, similar to the case in Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987).
Both the ﬁrms’ owners can assess the performance of their managers according to two readily
observable indicators–the output and proﬁt of the ﬁrm. In this case, the objective of each
manager is given by
Ui = Πi + µiqi; µi 2 R; i = 1;2;
where parameter µi measures the relevance of the sales. The manager of ﬁrm i can maximize his
or her payoﬀ by choosing the output qi or the price pi that maximizes Ui (i = 1;2). This can be
supported by the assumption that the payoﬀ to the manager of ﬁrm i is represented as ¸i+¹iVi
for some real number ¸i and some positive number ¹i (i = 1;2). Similar to many existing works,
we assume that the payoﬀs to the managers are negligible as compared to the proﬁts, because
we emphasize the impact of managerial delegation on the equilibrium outcomes.
We propose the following two-stage delegation game. In the ﬁrst stage, an owner and his or
her manager bargain over the incentive parameter µi in each ﬁrm (i = 1;2). Subsequently, in the
second stage, each manager simultaneously decides his or her output or price, being aware of the
level of his or her own incentive parameter. Thus, an owner and a manager bargain over their
incentive parameters in the sales delegation contracts such that both their proﬁts and payoﬀs
are enhanced through their collusive market behaviors.
The bargaining in the ﬁrst stage is generally formulated in the same manner as in Binmore
et al. (1986). For each ﬁrm, the equilibrium outcome of the bargaining process coincides with
the Nash bargaining solution of the following equation in terms of the incentive parameter µi:
Bi = U
¯
i ¢ Π
1¡¯
i ; i = 1;2;
where ¯ 2 [0;1) denotes the measure for the relative bargaining power of the manager. Note
that in this paper, we restrict our attention to the symmetric case in which all managers have
the same bargaining powers denoted as ¯. As a result, we assume that owners select suﬃciently
homogeneous managers both in terms of their bargaining powers and the preferences to their
payoﬀs. The disagreement point of both owner and manager is zero: If the bargaining process
breaks down, the managers are unable to procure other jobs, and the owners are unable to
operate their ﬁrms due to the lack of time or managerial skills.
3 Quantity Competition
In this section, we consider how proﬁts, consumer surplus, and social welfare depend on the man-
agers’ relative bargaining power, ¯, for the sales delegation in the case of quantity competition
in a diﬀerentiated-products duopolistic setting.
As usual, we begin by solving the second stage. Given a pair of incentive parameters µ1 and
µ2, each manager maximizes his or her objective Ui with respect to qi (i = 1;2). The condition
for each manager is given by
@Ui
@qi
= a ¡ (2 + k)qi ¡ bqj + µi = 0; i;j = 1;2; i 6= j:
3Solving the system of the above equations for q0 and q1, we obtain the output of each ﬁrm as
follows:
qi =
a(2 ¡ b + k) + (2 + k)µi ¡ bµj
(2 + k)
2 ¡ b2 ; i;j = 1;2; i 6= j:
From the ﬁrst-order condition of the above system, we have
Ui =
2 + k
2
(qi)
2 ; Πi =
2 + k
2
(qi)
2 ¡ µiqi; i = 1;2:
Thus, we obtain the following results:
@Ui
@µi
=
(2 + k)
2 qi
(2 + k)
2 ¡ b2 > 0;
@2Πi
@µ2
i
= ¡
(2 + k)
h
(2 + k)
2 ¡ 2b2
i
h
(2 + k)
2 ¡ b2
i2 < 0; 8b 2 (0;1); i = 1;2:
In short, similar to the results of the sales delegation case of van Witteloostuijn et al. (2007),
we obtain the result that the objective function of the manager Ui is an increasing function of
µi, and the proﬁt of each ﬁrm is an concave function of µi (i = 1;2). The interests of the owner
and manager of each ﬁrm are diﬀerent. Therefore, it is appropriate for them to bargain over
the incentive parameter, µi (i = 1;2). Furthermore, the use of the weighted Nash product as a
solution concept in our model is supported by Kaneko’s (1980) extension of the Nash bargaining
problem to the case with a compact but not necessarily convex payoﬀ possibility set, similar to
the argument in Kamaga and Nakamura (2008).
We now proceed to the analysis of the ﬁrst stage of the game. Considering the outcomes in
the ﬁrst stage, we rewrite the Nash product for the bargaining problem of each ﬁrm as follows:
Bi = U
¯
i ¢ Π
1¡¯
i =
·
2 + k
2
(qi)
2
¸¯
¢
·
2 + k
2
(qi)
2 ¡ µiqi
¸1¡¯
; i = 1;2:
Thus, analogous to van Witteloostuijn et al. (2007), we obtain the following ﬁrst-order condition
for the bargaining of each ﬁrm:
@Bi
@µi
= 0 , qi
·
¯ ¡ 1 + (2 + k)
@qi
@µi
¸
¡ µi (1 + ¯)
@qi
@µi
= 0; i = 1;2:
Taking into account that @qi=@µi = 2=
¡
4 ¡ b2¢
and that the problem’s symmetry is µ = µ1 = µ2,
we obtain
µ¤ = µ¤
i =
a
h
b2 (1 ¡ ¯) + (2 + k)
2 ¯
i
(2 + k)
2 + b(2 + k)(1 + ¯) ¡ b2 (1 ¡ ¯)
; i = 1;2:
Furthermore, we obtain the following result:2
@Π¤
i
@¯
= ¡
a2 (2 + k)
h
(2 + k)
2 ¡ 2b2
ih
¯ (2 + k)
2 + b(2 + k)(1 + ¯) + b2 (1 ¡ ¯)
i
h
(2 + k)
2 + b(2 + k)(1 + ¯) ¡ b2 (1 ¡ ¯)
i3 < 0;
2The explicit expressions for the equilibrium market outcomes under both the Cournot and Bertrand compe-
titions are given in the Appendix.
48b 2 (0;1); 8¯ 2 [0;1):
Thus, we ﬁnd that the equilibrium proﬁt of each ﬁrm decreases for all the values of b 2 (0;1)
and ¯ 2 [0;1) as the relative bargaining power of the manager, ¯, increases. On the other hand,
we obtain
@CS¤
@¯
=
2a2 (1 + b)(2 + k)
2 (1 + ¯)
h
(2 + k)
2 ¡ 2b2
i
h
(2 + k)
2 + b(2 + k)(1 + ¯) ¡ b2 (1 ¡ ¯)
i3 > 0; 8b 2 (0;1); 8¯ 2 [0;1);
and
@W¤
@¯
=
2a2 (2 + k)
h
(2 + k)
2 ¡ 2b2
i©
(2 + k)[1 ¡ ¯ (1 + k)] ¡ b2 (1 ¡ ¯)
ª
h
(2 + k)
2 + b(2 + k)(1 + ¯) ¡ b2 (1 ¡ ¯)
i3 R 0;
, ¯ Q
2 ¡ b2 + k
2 ¡ b2 + 3k + k2:
In the marginal cost case in van Witteloostuijn et al. (2007), Nakamura (2008), and Kamaga
and Nakamura (2008), as the value of the relative bargaining power of managers, ¯, is increasing,
the increase of consumer surplus outweighs the decrease of producer surplus. On the other hand,
in the case where the production technology of each ﬁrm is represented by a quadratic cost
function, if the value of ¯ is suﬃciently large, social welfare may deteriorate, since the total cost
in this market predominantly raises with the increase of the output of each ﬁrm. The following
proposition tells us these properties led by the introduction of the bargaining over the delegation
parameter between an owner and a manager in the quadratic cost case.
Proposition 1. In the delegation game with the bargaining over the sales delegation parameter
between an owner and a manager, there exists a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, which
depends on the managers’ bargaining power ¯. In the equilibrium, if the relative bargaining
power of managers increases, the proﬁt of each ﬁrm decreases, whereas the consumer surplus
increases. Furthermore, as the relative bargaining power of managers, ¯, increases, the equilib-
rium social welfare improves if ¯ 2
£
0;
¡
2 ¡ b2 + k
¢
=
¡
2 ¡ b2 + 3k + k2¢¢
, while it deteriorates
if ¯ 2
¡¡
2 ¡ b2 + k
¢
=
¡
2 ¡ b2 + 3k + k2¢
; 1
¢
, and thus the maximum value of the equilibrium
social welfare is achieved when ¯ =
¡
2 ¡ b2 + k
¢
=
¡
2 ¡ b2 + 3k + k2¢
.
Note that similar to the constant marginal cost case as in van Witteloostuijn et al. (2007),
Nakamura (2008) and Kamaga and Nakamura (2008), as the relative bargaining power of man-
agers, ¯ approaches 1, the equilibrium proﬁt of each ﬁrm, Π¤
i, approaches 0.
4 Price Competition
In this section, we analyze the price competition case in which each ﬁrm produces a diﬀerentiated
good. We again use backward induction and consider a two-stage process in which the an owner
and a manager bargain over the incentive parameter in the ﬁrst stage, and both the ﬁrms
compete with regard to prices in the second stage.
5Given a pair of incentive parameters µ1 and µ2, each manager maximizes the objective func-
tion Ui with respect to pi (i = 1;2). The ﬁrst-order condition for each manager is given by
@Ui
@pi
=
a(1 ¡ b)
¡
1 ¡ b2 + k
¢
¡
¡
2 ¡ 2b2 + k
¢
pi + b
¡
1 ¡ b2 + k
¢
pj ¡
¡
1 ¡ b2¢
µi
(1 ¡ b2)
2 = 0;
i;j = 1;2; i 6= j:
Solving the system of the above equations for p0 and p1, we obtain the price of each ﬁrm as
follows:
pi =
a
£
2 ¡ b(1 + k) ¡ b2 (3 + 2k) + b3 + b4 + k(3 + k)
¤
¡ µi
¡
2 ¡ 2b2 + k
¢
¡ bµj
¡
1 ¡ b2 + k
¢
b4 + (2 + k)
2 ¡ b2 (5 + 2k)
;
i;j = 1;2; i 6= j:
Considering the ﬁrst-order condition of each manager, we obtain
Ui =
[a(1 ¡ b) ¡ pi + bpj]
©
2
¡
1 ¡ b2¢
pi ¡ k[a(1 ¡ b) ¡ pi + bpj] + 2
¡
1 ¡ b2¢
µi
ª
2(1 ¡ b2)
2 ;
Πi =
[a(1 ¡ b) ¡ pi + bpj]
©
2
¡
1 ¡ b2¢
pi ¡ k[a(1 ¡ b) ¡ pi + bpj]
ª
2(1 ¡ b2)
2 ; i;j = 1;2; i 6= j:
Thus, we obtain the following results:
@Ui
@µi
=
¡
2 ¡ b2 + k
¢¡
2 ¡ 2b2 + k
¢
b4 + (2 + k)
2 ¡ b2 (5 + 2k)
qi > 0;
@2Πi
@µ2
i
= ¡
(2 + k)
3 + b4 (4 + k) ¡ 2b2 ¡
6 + 5k + k2¢
h
b4 + (2 + k)
2 ¡ b2 (5 + 2k)
i2 < 0;
8b 2 (0;1); i = 1;2:
Therefore, similar to quantity competition, we ﬁnd that in price competition, the objective
function of each manager Ui is an increasing function of µi, and the proﬁt of each ﬁrm is a
concave function of µi (i = 1;2); further, by the same argument as in the previous section, the
use of the weighted Nash product as a solution concept of the owner-manager negotiation is
supported by Kaneko’s (1980) extension as indicated in Kamaga and Nakamura (2008).
Next, we analyze the bargaining between an owner and a manager in the ﬁrst stage. In the
case of price competition, the bargaining problem is as follows:
Bi = U
¯
i ¢ Π
1¡¯
i
=
(
[a(1¡b)¡pi+bpj]f2(1¡b2)pi¡k[a(1¡b)¡pi+bpj]+2(1¡b2)µig
2(1¡b2)
2
)¯
¢
(
[a(1¡b)¡pi+bpj]f2(1¡b2)pi¡k[a(1¡b)¡pi+bpj]g
2(1¡b2)
2
)1¡¯
;
i;j = 1;2; i 6= j:
Considering the problem’s symmetry, µ = µ1 = µ2, we obtain
@Bi
@µi
= 0 , a
¡
2 ¡ b ¡ b2 + k
¢h
(2 + k)
2 ¯ ¡ b2 (1 + k + 5¯ + 2k¯) + b4 (1 + ¯)
i
¡ µ
h
(2 + k)
3 + b(2 + k)
2 ¯ ¡ 2b2 ¡
6 + 5k + k2¢
¡ b3 (1 + k + 5¯ + 2k¯) + b4 (4 + k)
i
= 0;
6yielding
µ¤ = µ¤
i =
a
h
(2 + k)
2 ¯ + b4 (1 + ¯) ¡ b2 (1 + k + 5¯ + 2k¯)
i
(2 + k)
2 + b(2 + k)(1 + ¯) ¡ b2 (3 + k ¡ ¯) ¡ b3 (1 + ¯)
; i = 1;2:
Using the equilibrium market outcomes represented in the Appendix, we obtain the following
result:
@Π¤
i
@¯
= ¡
a2(2¡b2+k)[(2+k)2¡b2(4+k)]f¯(2+k)2+b(2+k)(1+¯)+b2[1¡¯(3+k)]¡b3(1+¯)g
[(2+k)2+b(2+k)(1+¯)¡b2(3+k¡¯)¡b3(1+¯)]
3 < 0;
8b 2 (0;1); 8¯ 2 [0;1):
Thus, we ﬁnd that the equilibrium proﬁt of each ﬁrm decreases for all the values of b 2 (0;1)
and ¯ 2 [0;1) as the relative bargaining power of the manager, ¯, increases. On the other hand,
we obtain
@CS¤
@¯
=
2a2(1+b)(2¡b2+k)
2
(1+¯)[(2+k)2¡b2(4+k)]
[(2+k)2+b(2+k)(1+¯)¡b2(3+k¡¯)¡b3(1+¯)]
3 > 0; 8b 2 (0;1); 8¯ 2 [0;1);
and
@W¤
@¯
=
2a2[(2+k)3¡2b2(6+5k+k2)+b4(4+k)]f(2+k)[1¡¯(1+k)]¡b2[2¡¯(2+k)]g
[(2+k)2+b(2+k)(1+¯)¡b2(3+k¡¯)¡b3(1+¯)]
3 R 0 , ¯ Q
2¡2b2+k
(2+k)(1¡b2+k)
:
In the case of both price competition and quantity competition, if the value of ¯ is suﬃciently
large, social welfare may decrease due to the excessively high total cost in the market, owing to
the aggressive behavior of each ﬁrm. This fact is stated in the following proposition:
Proposition 2. In the delegation game with the bargaining over the sales delegation parameter
between an owner and a manager, there exists a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, which
depends on the managers’ bargaining power ¯. In the equilibrium, if the relative bargaining
power of managers increases, the proﬁt of each ﬁrm decreases, whereas the consumer surplus
increases. Furthermore, as the managers’ relative bargaining power, ¯ increases, the equilibrium
social welfare improves if ¯ 2
£
0;
¡
2 ¡ 2b2 + k
¢
=(2 + k)
¡
1 ¡ b2 + k
¢¢
, while it deteriorates if
¯ 2
¡¡
2 ¡ 2b2 + k
¢
=(2 + k)
¡
1 ¡ b2 + k
¢
; 1
¢
; thus, the maximum value of the equilibrium social
welfare is achieved when ¯ =
¡
2 ¡ 2b2 + k
¢
=(2 + k)
¡
1 ¡ b2 + k
¢
.
Note that analogous to quantity competition, as ¯ approaches 1, the equilibrium proﬁt of
each ﬁrm, Π¤
i, approaches 0.
5 Conclusion
This paper examined the bargaining between an owner and a manager over managerial incentive
contracts for the sales delegation case in two types of diﬀerentiated-products markets under
Cournot and Bertrand competitions. In particular, we focused on the case where the production
technology of each ﬁrm is represented by a quadratic cost function. We analyzed whether or not
the results in the constant marginal cost case as in van Witteloostuijn et al. (2007), Nakamura
(2008) and Kamaga and Nakamura (2008) – that the equilibrium social welfare is positively
associated with the increase of the relative bargaining power of managers, ¯ – is consistent with
7that obtained in this paper. Consequently, we obtained the result that under the two types of
market competition, Cournot and Bertrand competition, the equilibrium social welfare decreases
as the relative bargaining power of managers increases, provided the value of ¯ is suﬃciently
large. This phenomenon occurs since the total cost in this market is too high to the degree that
the decrease in the producer surplus outweighs the increase in the consumer surplus due to the
aggressive behavior of each ﬁrm. Therefore, the result of the managerial delegation game with
bargaining between an owner and a manager is not robust against the change in the style of
each ﬁrm’s cost function.
Future research should address the application of other delegation regimes, such as the
market share delegation in Jansen et al. (2007)) and the relative performance case in Miller and
Pazgal (2002), to this model. We must examine the robustness of the result in this paper against
such the other delegation regimes.
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Appendix
Solving the game by backward induction, we derive the following equilibrium market outcomes
in each competition type.
Cournot Competition:
q¤
i =
a(2 + k)(1 + ¯)
(2 + k)
2 + b(2 + k)(1 + ¯) ¡ b2 (1 ¡ ¯)
; p¤
i =
a
£
(2 + k)(1 + k ¡ ¯) ¡ b2 (1 ¡ ¯)
¤
(2 + k)
2 + b(2 + k)(1 + ¯) ¡ b2 (1 ¡ ¯)
;
Π¤
i =
a2 (2 + k)
¡
1 ¡ ¯2¢h
(2 + k)
2 ¡ 2b2
i
2
h
(2 + k)
2 + b(2 + k)(1 + ¯) ¡ b2 (1 ¡ ¯)
i2; i = 1;2;
CS¤ =
a2 (1 + b)(2 + k)
2 (1 + ¯)
2
h
(2 + k)
2 + b(2 + k)(1 + ¯) ¡ b2 (1 ¡ ¯)
i2;
W¤ =
a2 (2 + k)
n
(1 + b)(2 + k)(1 + ¯)
2 ¡
h
2b2 ¡ (2 + k)
2
i¡
1 ¡ ¯2¢o
h
(2 + k)
2 + b(2 + k)(1 + ¯) ¡ b2 (1 ¡ ¯)
i2 :
Bertrand Competition:
p¤
i =
a
£
(2 + k)(1 + k ¡ ¯) ¡ b2 (2 + k ¡ 2¯)
¤
(2 + k)
2 + b(2 + k)(1 + ¯) ¡ b2 (3 + k ¡ ¯) ¡ b3 (1 + ¯)
;
q¤
i =
a
¡
2 ¡ b2 + k
¢
(1 + ¯)
(2 + k)
2 + b(2 + k)(1 + ¯) ¡ b2 (3 + k ¡ ¯) ¡ b3 (1 + ¯)
;
Π¤
i =
a2 ¡
2 ¡ b2 + k
¢h
(2 + k)
2 ¡ b2 (4 + k)
i
(1 ¡ ¯)(1 + ¯)
2
h
(2 + k)
2 + b(2 + k)(1 + ¯) ¡ b2 (3 + k ¡ ¯) ¡ b3 (1 + ¯)
i2; i = 1;2;
CS¤ =
a2 (1 + b)(1 + ¯)
2 ¡
2 ¡ b2 + k
¢2
h
(2 + k)
2 + b(2 + k)(1 + ¯) ¡ b2 (3 + k ¡ ¯) ¡ b3 (1 + ¯)
i2;
W¤ =
a2 (1 + ¯)
n¡
2 ¡ b2 + k
¢
(1 ¡ ¯)
h
(2 + k)
2 ¡ b2 (4 + k)
i
+ (1 + b)(1 + ¯)
¡
2 ¡ b2 + k
¢2o
h
(2 + k)
2 + b(2 + k)(1 + ¯) ¡ b2 (3 + k ¡ ¯) ¡ b3 (1 + ¯)
i2 :
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